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Introduction and summary
The growing use of inflation targeting and other forms 
of quantified inflation objectives has marked the his-
tory of monetary policy since 1990. Indeed, a majority 
of industrialized countries have either adopted some 
form of inflation targeting or, most notably for the  
15 countries that have adopted the euro, defined a quan-
tified inflation objective. In the United States, the 
Federal Reserve System aims to conduct the nation’s 
monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit 
conditions in the economy in pursuit of “maximum em-
ployment, stable prices, and moderate long-term inter-
est rates.”1 The Fed does not have an inflation target.
An inflation target is a numerical point or range 
for the inflation of a given price index that the central 
bank declares to be its objective for inflation. For in-
stance, the Bank of Canada aims to keep inflation at 
the 2 percent target. And the European Central Bank 
(ECB) aims to keep inflation below but close to 2 per-
cent. Central banks that have a quantified inflation 
objective do structure the communication of their 
monetary policy around this objective.2 Table 1 shows 
how various central banks currently define their infla-
tion objectives, as reported on the central banks’ web-
sites. Table 2 shows when these targets were adopted 
and how they have changed. Inflation point targets 
and the midpoints of inflation target ranges are usual-
ly between 2 percent and 2.5 percent. These targets 
were first introduced between the early 1990s and the 
early 2000s. There is a broad consensus among econ-
omists that, as shown in figure 1, countries that have 
adopted an inflation target have stabilized inflation 
close to the inflation target. 
In theory, a major virtue of quantified inflation ob-
jectives is to anchor inflation expectations—a key in-
gredient for the success of monetary policy. Stabilizing 
inflation expectations is important3 because prices 
and wages adjust relatively infrequently (for the most 
up-to-date evidence, see Dhyne et al., 2005; Fabiani 
et al., 2005; Vermeulen et al., 2007; and the references 
therein). The people and institutions in the economy 
(we call these economic agents) usually set prices and 
wages over some horizon, and the level of these prices 
and wages would reflect their expectation of the evo-
lution of inflation. If these economic agents know what 
the official inflation target is and the target is credible, 
they will expect the general price level to grow at the 
rate of the preannounced objective of the central 
bank. This expectation in itself then helps to deliver 
realized inflation close to the target.
While many economists find this argument to be 
convincing, there has been little research so far on 
whether the central banks’ targets actually do a better 
job at forecasting inflation than other inflation bench-
marks. In this article, we evaluate the potential bene-
fits of inflation targets by comparing the performance 
of benchmark forecasts of inflation (model-based and 
published forecasts) and forecasts that are set equal to 
the inflation target. We conduct this comparison of 
forecast performance for the euro area, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom, all of which have established 
inflation targets as shown in table 1. 34 2Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
Euro area  The primary objective of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy is to maintain 
price stability. The ECB aims at (harmonized index of consumer prices, or HICP) inflation rates 
of below, but close to, 2 percent over the medium term. 
Australia  In pursuing the goal of medium-term price stability, both the bank and the government agree 
on the objective of keeping consumer price inflation between 2 percent and 3 percent, on 
average, over the cycle. This formulation allows for the natural short-run variation in inflation 
over the business cycle while preserving a clearly identifiable performance benchmark over time.
Canada  The Bank of Canada aims to keep inflation at the 2 percent target, the midpoint of the  
1 percent to 3 percent inflation-control target range. This target is expressed in terms of  
total Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation, but the bank uses a measure of core inflation as  
an operational guide. Core inflation provides a better measure of the underlying trend of 
inflation and tends to be a better predictor of future changes in the total CPI.
New Zealand  The Reserve Bank uses monetary policy to maintain price stability as defined in the policy 
targets agreement (PTA). The current PTA requires the bank to keep inflation between  
1 percent and 3 percent on average over the medium term. The bank implements monetary 
policy by setting the official cash rate (OCR), which is reviewed eight times a year.
Norway  The government has defined an inflation target for monetary policy in Norway. The operational 
target is an inflation rate of 2.5 percent over time (with annual consumer price inflation of 
approximately 2.5 percent over time).
Sweden  According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, the objective of monetary policy is to “maintain  
price stability.” The Riksbank [or the central bank of Sweden] has interpreted this objective 
to mean a low, stable rate of inflation. More precisely, the Riksbank’s objective is to keep 
inflation around 2 percent per year, as measured by the annual change in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). There is a tolerance range of plus/minus 1 percentage point around this target.  
At the same time, the range is an expression of the Riksbank’s ambition to limit such 
deviations. In order to keep inflation around 2 percent, the Riksbank adjusts its key interest 
rate, the repo rate.
Switzerland  The Swiss National Bank equates price stability with a rise in the national Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) of less than 2 percent per annum. In so doing, it takes account of the fact that 
not every price movement is necessarily inflationary in nature. Furthermore, it believes that 
inflation cannot be measured accurately. Measurement problems arise, for example, when  
the quality of goods and services improves. Such changes are not properly accounted for in 
the CPI; as a result, the measured level of inflation will tend to be slightly overstated.
United Kingdom  A principal objective of any central bank is to safeguard the value of the currency in terms of 
what it will purchase. Rising prices—inflation—reduces the value of money. ... In May 1997, 
the government gave the bank independence to set monetary policy by deciding the level of 
interest rates to meet the government’s inflation target—currently 2 percent. [The inflation 
target of 2 percent is expressed in terms of an annual rate of inflation based on the  
Consumer Prices Index (CPI).] 
Sources: European Central Bank, www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html; Reserve Bank of Australia, www.rba.gov.au/MonetaryPolicy/; Bank 
of Canada, www.bank-banque-canada.ca/en/monetary/monetary_main.html; Reserve Bank of New Zealand, www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/index.
html; Norges Bank, www.norges-bank.no/Pages/Section____11330.aspx; Sveriges Riksbank, www.riksbank.com/templates/SectionStart.
aspx?id=10602; Swiss National Bank, www.snb.ch/en/iabout/monpol; and Bank of England, www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/ 
index.htm.
TaBlE 1
Inflation objectives in selected Organization for Economic Cooperation and

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We also report results for the  
U.S., where inflation is often mea-
sured with the core Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures (PCE) Price 
Index—a broad measure of consum-
er prices that excludes the more vol-
atile and seasonal food and energy 
prices. Although the Federal Reserve 
does not have an inflation target, 
many market participants and econ-
omists assume that the U.S. central 
bank’s price stability mandate can 
be associated with numerical values 
for the core PCE inflation rate: 
Some have argued that this rate is 
close to 2 percent,4 while others 
think that the Federal Reserve may 
have a “comfort zone” that is be-
tween 1 percent and 2 percent. Fig-
ure 2 shows that core PCE inflation 
was indeed close to these numerical 
values over the last decade. So, for 
comparison, we also assess the fore-
casting performance of two selected 
“constant forecast benchmarks” for 
the U.S.—one of core PCE inflation 
at 2 percent and the other at 1.5 per-
cent (which is the midpoint of the 
alleged “comfort zone”).
Our results provide support for 
inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy strategy. In all the countries 
in our sample and in the euro area, 
forecasting that inflation will be at 
the inflation “target” implies a small-
er forecasting error than alternative 
models. This is true for both one- 
and two-year horizon forecasts. Fore-
casting inflation to be at the target 
also beats the mean of professional 
economists’ forecasts published in 
Consensus Forecasts for the euro 
area, Canada, and Sweden, as well 
as for two-years-ahead forecasts in 
Switzerland and in the United King-
dom.5 In the case of the U.S., fore-
casting core PCE inflation to be a 
constant benchmark (either at 2 per-
cent or 1.5 percent) also implies a 
relatively small error on average 
over the past 12 years.36 2Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
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                                              Target ranges           Point target
Notes: For panel G, in the United Kingdom, CPI is the Consumer Prices Index, and RPIX is the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments.
See tables 1 and 2 for details on the inflation objectives over the time period.
Sources: Roger and Stone (2005) and authors’ calculations based on data from Haver Analytics.37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
To our knowledge, this article is the first one to 
show that, while inflation is never exactly at the tar-
get, the central bank’s target has provided an ex ante 
reliable and, to a large extent, unbeatable inflation 
forecasting device in countries that have adopted a 
quantified inflation objective. When agents in the 
economy choose the inflation target as their expecta-
tion of future inflation, it is more likely that the target 
is actually hit or at least that low and stable inflation 
is maintained. 
In the next section, we discuss the role of infla-
tion targets in the formation of inflation expectations. 
Then, we describe the forecasting models and report 
the results of a “horse race” of inflation forecasts, 
comparing the error incurred by taking the target as a 
forecast with other widely used forecasting approaches. 
Rule-of-thumb expectations and inflation 
targets 
The formation of inflation expectations plays a 
large role in the success of monetary policy. Since all 
prices and wages cannot be readjusted constantly, an-
choring inflation expectations at a low level is essen-
tial to ensure price stability.
The academic debate on inflation expectations 
has centered on the operational mode of expectation 
formation. However, inflation expectations are not 
observable. As a result, several views on expectation 
formation that are mutually exclusive cannot easily 
be proven to be inconsistent with the data (Lindé, 2001). 
The most popular view has long been that infla-
tion expectations are rational. Rational expectations 
take two complementary meanings. First, expectations 
need to fulfill certain criteria to be rational. Thus, ra-
tional expectations cannot be systematically or persis-
tently wrong. As a result, a good approximation of 
rational expectations is the result of a regression of 
future realizations of inflation on past and present ob-
servable economic variables. By construction, this 
procedure yields expectation errors that are zero on 
average. In addition, if the set of economic variables 
taken into account is comprehensive enough, this pro-
cedure is consistent with the requirement that expec-
tations take into account all available information. 
The second meaning of rational expectations formu-
lates that in any given model of the economy, agents 
form their expectations in a way that is consistent 
with the functioning of the model. 
Although the assumption of rational expectations 
is frequently used in model construction and simula-
tions, the empirical relevance is still controversial.6  
In particular, inflation expectations seem to depend 
significantly on past and present values of inflation 
(for example, Estrella and Fuhrer, 1999). Hence, 
some economists have advocated that expectations 
should be approximated by simpler expectation 
mechanisms, such as projecting inflation to be at the 
level observed in the past. 
Note that such “rule-of-thumb” expectations are 
not necessarily irrational to the extent that rules de-
riving future inflation from its past values may be the 
most efficient use of current available information to 
derive the outlook for inflation. A good rationale for 
such a rule of thumb is precisely that inflation proves 
extremely difficult to forecast with multivariate eco-
nomic models.7 Simple rules of thumb may therefore 
optimally solve the trade-off between accuracy of the 
expectations and effort spent to derive them.8 Howev-
er, especially at times of persistent changes in infla-
tion, such backward-looking rules will lead to 
recurring forecast errors of persistent signs.
In countries where the central bank has announced 
an inflation target, a natural rule of thumb consists of 
expecting that future inflation would be at the target. 
The forecast error of this rule of thumb is given by 
the deviation of realized inflation from the prean-
nounced target. It is different from zero because the 
central bank cannot deliver an inflation rate that is ex-
actly on target every period. However, the degree of 
forecast error will depend on which benchmarks are 
used and, in particular, on whether alternative fore-
casts are better or worse. 
FIguRE 2
Inflation and selected constant forecast
benchmarks for the U.S.
percent








Notes: The U.S. Federal Reserve System does not have an 
inflation target. Core PCE is the Personal Consumption 
Expenditures Price Index excluding food and energy prices. 
See the text for further details on the selected constant 
forecast benchmarks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Haver 
Analytics.38 2Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
How well do you forecast inflation if you 
believe in the central bank’s target?
We first check how accurate “forecasts” of agents 
taking the central bank’s target for granted (henceforth, 
“target forecasts”) would perform compared with fore-
casts based on six alternative benchmarks: random walk; 
a track record or past mean inflation; three specifica-
tions of an autoregressive (AR) model of inflation, 
that is, a model where past and current inflation help 
forecast future inflation; and, finally, the mean infla-
tion forecast published in Consensus Forecasts. These 
models, which are standard benchmarks in the fore-
cast evaluation literature, have proved difficult to beat 
when trying to forecast inflation (Stock and Watson, 
2003; and Banerjee, Marcellino, and Masten, 2003). 
The quantified inflation objectives of central banks
An inflation target takes the form of either a nu-
merical value or a range for inflation and a commit-
ment by the central bank to stabilize inflation close to 
the target level. Central banks that have a quantified 
inflation objective put it at the core of the communi-
cation of their monetary policy.9 Table 1 (p. 34) reports 
the current (as of January 2008) definitions of the cen-
tral banks’ inflation objectives taken from their web-
sites. Table 2 (p. 35) shows the timing of the adoption 
of the targets and how they have changed over time. 
Figure 1 (p. 36) shows how the targets compare with 
actual inflation. The central banks’ inflation targets are 
now typically between 1 percent and 3 percent. Some 
central banks target a range (Australia, euro area, and 
Switzerland) and others a specific rate (Norway). Some 
banks have changed the definition of their objective 
over time (euro area and UK), while some have not 
(Australia). Changes have involved the range target 
(New Zealand and euro area) or even a change in the 
index for which the target is defined (UK).10 
Going from the definition of the inflation targets 
to a target forecast requires two main assumptions. 
The first one is to choose a numerical value for the 
target. We choose the effective point target when the 
central bank has defined one (Canada, Norway, Sweden, 
and the UK from 1996 onward) or, in the case of 
countries with inflation range targets (Australia, New 
Zealand, Switzerland, and UK before 1996), we use 
the midpoint of the range in order to have a point  
estimate to which actual inflation can be compared 
(following Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-Altimari, and  
Rodrígues-Palenzuela, 2003). In the case of the euro 
area, the choice of a specific number for the inflation 
quantified objective is somewhat more delicate. In 
1998, the ECB had defined its inflation objective as  
a positive inflation rate less than 2 percent over the 
medium run. In May 2003, the ECB clarified its infla-
tion objective as below but close to 2 percent.11 We set 
the inflation objective for the euro area at 1.9 percent. 
While this choice is somewhat arbitrary and not nec-
essarily in line with the perception of the ECB objec-
tive between 1999 and 2003, we believe it is consistent 
with the ECB strategy both before and after May 2003. 
Finally, we also analyze the case of the U.S. As 
noted earlier, in contrast with the other central banks 
we study in this article, the Federal Reserve does not 
set a target for inflation. However, some observers 
have suggested that the Federal Reserve has an im-
plicit target of 2 percent for core PCE inflation.12 
Some others consider that the Federal Reserve has a 
“comfort zone” that is between 1 percent and 2 per-
cent. We thought it would be interesting to apply the 
same type of test to the forecasting performance of 
these working assumptions as we do to the official  
inflation targets of other countries, purely as an aca-
demic exercise. We therefore assess the size of the er-
rors implied by forecasting core PCE inflation rates to 
be constant, either at 2 percent or 1.5 percent.   
The second assumption we need to make is our 
choice of forecast evaluation period. Given the medi-
um-term nature of the central banks’ objectives, which 
we interpret as a two-year horizon, we start our fore-
cast evaluation period two years after the inflation 
target has been announced. Hence, in the case of  
Australia, where the inflation targeting strategy was 
launched in 1993, the forecast evaluation commences 
for forecasts of inflation for the first quarter of 1995. 
In the case of the euro area, we record forecast per-
formances from 2001 onward. The level of the infla-
tion forecast and the first date of the forecast evaluation 
are reported in table 2 (p. 35). In the case of the U.S., 
we arbitrarily start the forecasting evaluation in 1995.
Forecasting models
The target forecast model (“Target” in tables 3–5 





















100, that is, it is the inflation
rate for four quarters, h is either four quarters or eight 
quarters, P is the level of the price index, and π* is 
the inflation quantified objective defined in the next  
to last column of table 2. The range of t + h dates for 
which the model is evaluated is given in the last col-
umn of table 2. 39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
We should stress that the forecasts are the same 
whatever the horizon of the forecast. In this article, 
we report results only for h equal to four and eight 
quarters ahead.13
We compare the target forecast performance with 
the forecasts from our six alternative measures. The 
first of these is the random walk forecast; that is, we 
forecast inflation to be equal to the inflation observed 
over the year to the date when the forecast is made:




This forecasting model is sometimes formulated 
in the first difference of inflation, that is, changes in 
inflation from one period to the next. We stick to a level 
formulation, however, because inflation shows no 
trend for the sample over which the forecast evalua-
tion is conducted. We also record the forecast perfor-
mance of considering that future inflation would be 
well approximated by the average inflation level over 
the past five years (or 20 quarters). This naive forecast 
considers that the recent track record of inflation is 


















The main advantage with respect to the first model 
(equation 1) is that it may smooth out temporary noise 
in current inflation.
We then base inflation forecasts on three autore-
gressive models.14 The first of these models simply 
relates current inflation to its lag levels, where the min-
imum lag is defined by the forecasting horizon. It is:
3 4 ) , π απ βπ ε t t h t h t C = + + + − − −
where C, α, and b are parameters and ε an error term, 
which are to be estimated recursively by ordinary 
least squares over the sample from the first quarter of 
1986 to t.
This simplifies the forecasting procedure as it can 
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where the coefficients with ^ have been estimated.
We also present results for two variants of this 
model. First, we formulate the autoregressive model 
on the first difference of inflation. This formulation 
has the advantage that any change in the level of in-
flation would affect the forecasting performance of the 
model only for one observation (Banerjee, Marcellino, 
and Masten, 2003): 
4 1 ) , ∆ ∆ ∆ π α π β π ε t t h t h t C = + + + − − −
4 1 a) , π π α π β π
t h
t t t t C
+
− = + + + ∆ ∆
^ ^ ^
where ∆π π π t t t = − −4.
Second, in line with Labhard, Kapetanios, and 
Price (2007), we take into account potential breaks in 
the mean of inflation due to announcements of changes 
in the inflation objective by the central banks.15 Hence, 
we enrich the AR model by allowing for changes in 
the intercept eight quarters after a change to the infla-
tion targeting regime. In the case of Australia, for in-
stance, the central bank announced its objective in 
1993. We therefore include a one-step dummy taking 
a zero value before 1995 (1993 plus eight quarters) 
and one thereafter. We refer to this second set of 
models as “AR models with breaks.” They are:
5 4 ) , π απ βπ ε t i i t h t h t C C Ind = + + + + ∑ − − −
5 4 a) , π απ βπ
t h
t i i t t C C Ind
+
− = + + + ∑
^ ^ ^ ^
where Indi is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 
from eight quarters after the announced change in  
the target. 
We estimate the models from the first quarter of 
1986 onward with year-on-year inflation rates.16 The 
out-of-sample forecast evaluation is then carried out 
in pseudo real time. For example, the models are esti-
mated from the first quarter of 1986 through the fourth 
quarter of 1994. Based on this estimation, we calculate 
forecasts at horizons four quarters and eight quarters 
ahead. Then we store the associated forecast errors 
and the one of taking the inflation forecast equal to 
the central bank’s quantified objective π*, defined as 
follows:
π π π π
π
1995 1







− −    
−
     and
* ,
π π π π 1996 1 1996 1 Q Q      and −    
* .
The setup is brought forward sequentially by one 
quarter until the end of the evaluation sample. 
Finally, we compare target forecasts to the  
Consensus Forecasts (hereafter, referred to as the 40 2Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
“consensus”), which is the mean of the forecasts sur-





















The consensus should represent informed fore-
casts produced on the basis of comprehensive infor-
mation sets. Notably, respondents to the survey should 
be aware of the central bank’s inflation objective. In 
principle, differences between the views of economists 
on future inflation and the central bank’s stated objec-
tive can indicate that such an objective lacks credibility. 
However, inflation targets could be credible, albeit only 
in the medium run. For shorter horizons, economists 
may take into account a variety of factors that make 
actual inflation deviate temporarily from the target. 
Data on the professionals’ forecasts for future in-
flation (for the current and following years) are available 
since 1990 for Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the UK and since 2002 for the euro area. However, 
we compile pre-2002 data as averages of country-level 
data (except Luxembourg), with fixed weights corre-
sponding to the countries’ share in euro area consump-
tion.17 This current and following year framework 
differs from the rolling forecast horizon used to eval-
uate models 1–5. In order to compare the performance 
of the consensus with the degree of accuracy that tar-
get forecasts would have yielded had they been formed 
at the same time as the consensus surveys, we need to 
pay attention to the calendar of inflation data releases 
and the timetable of the consensus surveys. Publica-
tion delays of inflation data differ from one country 
to another and, in some cases, have changed over the 
period we study here. However, inflation data are typ-
ically published about one month after the end of the 
reference period. Meanwhile, the consensus survey re-
sults for a month, M, correspond to answers collected 
up to the middle of the previous month M – 1. We can 
therefore make the following comparisons. Consensus 
forecasts  of inflation in the current year published in 
February rely on inflation data up to December of the 
previous year. Therefore, we need to forecast the whole 
year. We then compare these forecasts with four-quar-
ters-ahead target forecasts. Similarly, we compare 
forecasts of inflation in the following year published 
in February with eight-quarters-ahead target forecasts. 
Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the mean absolute errors 
(MAEs) and the root mean square errors (RMSEs)18 
of the target forecast and the five alternative quarterly 
models laid out in equations 1–5. Table 5 compares 
similar statistics for Consensus Forecasts and the tar-
get forecasts at an annual frequency. These statistics 
are computed for the forecast evaluation periods that 
begin either in 1995 or eight quarters after the instau-
ration of the inflation quantified objective. For most 
countries, this is from 1995 through 2007—that is, 
for 52 quarterly forecasts for tables 3 and 4 and for 
13 annual observations for table 5. However, the 
forecast evaluation starts only in 2001 for the euro 
area and Switzerland and in 2003 for Norway. In the 
case of the UK, the forecast evaluation is split in 
2004 to reflect the change in the underlying price index.  
For each row in tables 3–5, the numbers in bold 
indicate the smallest forecast errors. In tables 3 and 4, 
for each column we also compute the mean performance 
of each model across countries as the mean distance 
to the best performing model for each country. 
Our results provide strong support for the infla-
tion target forecasts as good devices for inflation fore-
casting. This is especially true at the eight quarters 
horizon, where forecasting the target systematically 
beats all other forecasting approaches (that is, has both 
the smallest MAE and smallest RMSE) except in the 
UK, where the best model for the Consumer Prices 
Index (CPI) is the simple AR model in equation 3. 
But one should take this particular result for the UK 
with a grain of salt because our evaluation is conducted 
only over 16 observations (from 2004 through 2007). 
At the four quarters horizon, the performance of 
forecasting the target remains very impressive. This 
model is the best performing one in terms of either 
mean absolute errors (table 3) or root mean square  
errors (table 4) in Canada, Norway, and Switzerland. 
In both tables 3 and 4, the performance of forecasting 
the target is very close to the best model in most other 
cases: less than 0.05 percentage points above the best 
model in the euro area and Australia and less than 
0.10 percentage points above the best model in New 
Zealand and Sweden. In the UK, the target forecast 
has an MAE and RMSE about 0.20 percentage points 
above the best model for the either the RPIX or the 
CPI. However, even at a four quarters horizon, the 
target forecast is the most robust approach in the 
sense that it is, on average, the closest to the best per-
forming model of each country.
The target forecasts yield significantly more ac-
curate forecasts than any of the autoregressive models 
and, hence, given the evidence reported in Stock and 
Watson (2003) and Banerjee, Marcellino, and Masten 
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TaBlE 5
Forecasting errors of target forecasts and Consensus Forecasts
	 Mean	absolute	errors	 Root	mean	square	errors
	 	 Consensus	 Consensus	 	 Consensus	 Consensus
	 	 one-year-ahead	 two-years-ahead	 	 one-year-ahead	 two-years-ahead
	 Target	 forecasts	 forecasts	 Target	 forecasts	 forecasts
Euro area  0.27  0.29  0.41  0.31  0.31  0.45
Canada  0.29  0.41  0.38  0.36  0.54  0.43
Sweden  0.65  0.69  0.67  0.88  0.95  0.88
Switzerland  0.24  0.21  0.41  0.27  0.33  0.48
UK  0.41  0.34  0.44  0.53  0.42  0.56
Notes: The forecast comparison is conducted in real time over the period 1995–2007 for Canada, Sweden, and the UK and over the period  
2001–07 for the euro area and Switzerland. The consensus forecasts are the ones published in the February issue of Consensus Forecasts  
of the current year for one-year-ahead forecasts and the past year for the two-years-ahead forecasts. The numbers in bold indicate the best model.
Performance of selected constant forecast benchmarks and model-based forecasts  
of U.S. core PCE inflation
	 Constant	forecast	benchmarks	 Alternative	models
	 1.5%	 2.0%	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Mean	absolute	errors
Forecast horizon
Four quarters  0.49  0.32  0.30  0.57  0.33  0.37  0.32
Eight quarters  0.49  0.32  0.38  0.74  0.65  0.34  0.64
Root	mean	square	errors
Forecast horizon
Four quarters  0.40  0.38  0.36  0.70  0.40  0.47  0.37
Eight quarters  0.40  0.38  0.45  0.92  0.87  0.42  0.86
Notes: The U.S. Federal Reserve System does not have an inflation target. Core PCE is the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index 
excluding food and energy prices. The forecasting performance of the constant forecast benchmarks for U.S. core PCE inflation is purely illustrative.  
The forecast comparison is conducted in real time over the period 1995:Q1–2007:Q4. The numbers in bold indicate the best model. 
Model 1 is the random walk, current year inflation; model 2 is the mean inflation over the last five years; model 3 is an autoregressive (AR) model  
in levels; model 4 is an AR model in first differences; and model 5 is an AR model in levels with breaks in the mean f inflation. See equations 1–5  
in the text for the exact specification of the forecast.
TaBlE 6
Table 5 shows the MAEs and the RMSEs of tar-
get forecasts and the Consensus Forecasts, though 
this time using yearly observations. For two-years-
ahead inflation forecasts, using the central bank’s  
target has yielded smaller forecasting errors than the 
consensus forecasts in terms of either MAEs or  
RMSEs for all countries under review. This is also 
observed at one-year-ahead forecasts, except for the 
UK according to both the MAE and RMSE criteria 
and for Switzerland according to the MAE criterion. 
One caveat applying to these results is that they 
are based on relatively short samples because of the 
availability of consensus forecasts for only the past 
15 years and the even more recent switch to quanti-
fied inflation objectives by central banks. However, in 
our view, the paths of the forecasts obtained from the 
autoregressive models, the consensus, and the central 
banks’ targets suggest that the central banks’ targets 
may constitute a new benchmark for forecast evaluation. 
Finally, table 6 reports MAEs and RMSEs of  
the constant forecast benchmarks of 1.5 percent and  
2 percent for U.S. core PCE inflation. Forecasting 
constant inflation at 2 percent has been the best at the 
eight quarters horizon and very close to the best at the 
four quarters horizon. These results show that, although 
the Federal Reserve does not have an inflation target, 
core PCE inflation has become remarkably stable in 
the U.S. since 1995.  
Taking a broader perspective, our results provide 
concrete evidence of the success of preannounced 
quantified objectives for inflation. One possible inter-
pretation of this success is that economic agents have 
indeed adopted the inflation target of the central bank 
as their inflation expectation for the general price level. 43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The inflation target may have become the focal point 
onto which decentralized inflation expectations have 
converged. This would occur if the target of the central 
bank is credible. That is, the central bank is always 
willing to take measures to ensure the target is reached 
over the specified horizon. 
Conclusion
We have shown that quantified inflation objec-
tives can be used as rule-of-thumb forecasting devices. 
The experience of various countries that have adopted 
such objectives shows that, to a large extent, such a 
rule of thumb yields smaller forecast errors than 
widely used forecasting models and the forecasts  
of professional experts published by Consensus  
Economics Inc. While inflation is never exactly at  
the target, the central banks’ targets have provided  
ex ante reliable and, to a large extent, unbeatable  
inflation forecasting devices in countries that have 
adopted a quantified inflation objective. These find-
ings suggest that the central banks that have set ex-
plicit targets for inflation have been successful in their 
often stated goal of anchoring inflation expectations.
NOTES
1This is according to the Federal Reserve Act; see  
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/fract/sect02a.htm.
2See Roger and Stone (2005) for a detailed description of the infla-
tion targeting in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development) and emerging economies.
3See the discussion in Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-Altimari, and  
Rodríguez-Palenzuela (2003); Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson 
(2006); Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004); and Svensson (1999).
4A prominent example is Goodfriend (2007).
5Consensus Forecasts—a monthly publication by Consensus 
Economics Inc.—reports the forecasts of inflation by various  
investment banks and public and private organizations that have 
their own inflation forecasts. For further details, see  
www.consensuseconomics.com.
6See, for instance, Rudd and Whelan (2006) and Sargent (1993).
7Stock and Watson (2003); Banerjee, Marcellino, and Masten 
(2003); and Banerjee and Marcellino (2003) show that multivariate 
models of inflation—that is, models where inflation dynamics are 
influenced by the evolution of other economic variables (output 
and unemployment)—hardly ever improve the forecast of inflation 
with respect to univariate nonstructural models of inflation. See 
also Fisher, Liu, and Zhou (2002) and Brave and Fisher (2004). 
8The recent discussion of rational inattention (Sims, 2003; Mankiw 
and Reis, 2002; and Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2005) models ex-
plicitly how the cost of information processing could cause agents 
to restrict the information on which they base economic decisions.
9Again, see Roger and Stone (2005) for a detailed description of 
the inflation targeting in OECD and emerging economies.
10In December 2003, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer an-
nounced that the Bank of England would change its inflation target 
from one based on the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage in-
terest payments (RPIX) to one based on the Consumer Prices Index 
(CPI)—also known there as the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP).
11See Issing (2003). 
12Goodfriend (2007).
13In a previous version of this article, we showed that the target 
forecast does not perform well at a one-quarter horizon—a result 
that is not surprising given that all central banks with an inflation 
target insist that inflation can be brought back to the target only 
over the medium run. In other words, it is widely agreed that mon-
etary policy should not aim at cancelling the high frequency vola-
tility of inflation.
14Other lag structures did not improve the forecasting results, so we 
use the simplest possible lag structure here.
15An obvious weakness of this model is that it assumes that the 
econometrician himself is convinced that the central bank an-
nouncement of a new target will immediately have an effect on the 
inflation process.
16Inflation time series were taken from Haver Analytics.
17Since respondents to Consensus Forecasts vary from country to 
country, these euro area constructs are not, strictly speaking, fore-
casts for the euro area economy. However, unless respondents of a 
particular country have systematic biases in their inflation forecast, 
the average inflation forecast across countries should be close to a 
forecast by an “average” forecaster for the average of the countries, 
that is, for the euro area as a whole.
18These two statistics are the most frequently used statistics to eval-
uate our sample forecasting performance. 44 2Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
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